Punitive damages are one of the most controversial aspects of tort litigation and have been the subject of various theoretical, empirical, and experimental studies. One criticism of punitive damages refers to the effect that they have on civil litigation processes. In particular, Polinsky (1997) argues that the uncertainty and unpredictability that punitive damage claims inject into a case may increase both the rate and amount of settlements, thus implying that punitive damages carry systemic consequences for the general processing of tort claims. This paper represents the first, empirical examination of this implication.
1 We thank workshop participants at Emory University's Law and Economics Colloquium and conference participants at the 2001 Law and Society Association and Research Committee on Sociology of Law International Sociological Association for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. This paper can be downloaded from http://www.terry.uga.edu/~dmustard/torts.pdf.
INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages are one of the most controversial aspects of tort litigation and have been the subject of various theoretical, empirical, and experimental studies. Critics maintain that punitive damage awards are highly unpredictable with large variations in size and that juries are ill-informed and poorly equipped to perform rational risk assessment. These criticisms are echoed in recent Supreme Court decisions imposing constitutional limits on the size of punitive damage awards.
2 Other scholars find these criticisms to be vastly exaggerated. They assert that punitive damage awards are rare, are made in appropriate cases, and the size of such awards relates strongly to compensatory damages.
Virtually all of the empirical and experimental research addressing these issues has focused on the outcome of trials, especially jury verdicts. Trials, however, are only the tip of the civil litigation iceberg. Fewer than 5% of civil cases filed result in trials (Eaton et al., 2000; Smith et al. 1995) ; plaintiffs prevail in approximately half of the tort cases that go to trial (DeFrances and Litras, 1999; Eaton et al., 2000; Moller, 1996) 3 ; and punitive damages are awarded in only 2-5% of the tort cases in which the plaintiff prevails (DeFrances and Litras, 1999; Lubin, 1998) . Thus, for every 1000 tort claims filed, typically only 50 are resolved by trial, only 25 produce trial outcomes favorable to the plaintiff, and only 1.25 have a punitive damage award. Consequently, our knowledge 2 E.g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) (punitive damages pose an "acute danger" of arbitrary deprivation of property; instructions leave the jury with "wide discretion" in choosing amounts; and "presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big business...") quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994) . of punitive damages is based on the examination of fewer than two of every thousand tort cases filed.
The impact of trial outcomes on cases that are settled or not resolved by trial is often referred to as the "shadow effect" (Koenig, 1998; Kritzer and Zemans, 1998) .
Critics argue that the shadow effect of punitive damage awards creates social disutility.
For example, Polinsky asserts that the uncertainty and unpredictability that a punitive damage claim injects into a case is likely to coerce defendants to settle a greater number of cases for higher amounts than they would if no punitive damage claim were involved (Polinsky, 1997) . Similarly, Priest claims that punitive damage "claims affect the settlement process by increasing the litigation rate and, necessarily, the ultimate magnitude of settlements, even in cases settled out of court." (Priest, 1996) . While it is theoretically plausible that a claim for punitive damages would affect the settlement process, this proposition has yet to be tested empirically.
Our paper brings an empirical perspective to the policy debate regarding the shadow effect of punitive damage awards on tort cases. By utilizing one of the most comprehensive and unique data sets on state tort litigation, our analysis contributes to the burgeoning literature on punitive damages in several ways. First, it is the first paper that directly measures the impact of seeking punitive damages on the actual processing of tort claims. Second, we distinguish between cases where a statutory cap on the amount of punitive damages is likely to apply and cases where the cap is probably not applicable. 4 Thus, we offer some insights regarding the different effects of capped and uncapped punitive damages might have on case processing. Third, in contrast to studies that rely on a small set of observations, we have over 25,000 cases from six Georgia counties, making it one of the largest and most diverse data sets of its kind. This large size allows us to control for important variables and to test alternative hypotheses that are often not considered. Fourth, most of the empirical research on tort litigation has relied on federal court data (e.g., Litras and DeFrances, 1999) or data from state courts of general jurisdiction in major urban areas (e.g., DeFrances and Litras, 1999; Eisenberg, LaFountain, Ostrom, Rottman, and Wells, 2002; Smith et al., 1995) . By contrast, our data were derived from two levels of trial courts in six geographic locations. Like most states, Georgia has trial courts of general jurisdiction (Superior Court) and trial courts of limited jurisdiction (State Court). Unlike most states, however, there is no amount in controversy limitation on State Court jurisdiction to hear tort cases. 5 Finally, many empirical studies of tort litigation rely on case records from one year (e.g., Smith, et al., 1995; DeFrances and Litras, 1999; Eisenberg, LaFountain, Ostrom, Rottman, and Wells, 2002) . Our data, however, consist of case records for four years.
We measured the impact of punitive damages on the processing of tort cases by looking at major decision points in the litigation process. These decision points include:
(1) whether a case filed in any given year was disposed or pending; (2) whether a disposed case was resolved by trial or by some other procedure, including settlement; (3) whether a case disposed without trial was more likely to be disposed by settlement (e.g., voluntary dismissal with prejudice); (4) whether a case disposed without trial was more 5 O.C.G.A. sec. 15-7-4(a).
likely to be disposed by a voluntary dismissal without prejudice so that it could be refiled; 6 (5) whether a case disposed by trial involved a jury or bench trial; and (6) whether punitive damages were awarded in trials in which the plaintiff prevailed. For each of these decision points we measured whether there were any statistically significant differences between cases in which punitive damages were sought and those without such a claim. We also measured whether there were significant differences between cases in which the punitive damage claim was likely to be subject to the statutory limit on punitive damages and those likely to not be subject to this limit.
The subsequent sections of this paper are organized as follows. The second section reviews research about punitive damages, while the third section offers methodological information related to the data set, hypotheses, variable measurement, and statistical tests. The fourth and fifth sections deal, respectively, with the results and their implications.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The issue of punitive damages has sparked a large volume of theoretical, empirical and experimental literature. The theoretical purposes of punitive damages are to punish and deter wrongdoing (Dobbs, 2000) . Sharkey advances an alternative rationale for punitive damages, and argues that punitive damages serve a beneficial role to compensate for "societal damages," i.e., damages to others directly harmed but not before the court (Shockley, 2003) . One body of scholarship maintains that current practices do 6 Under Georgia law, a suit that has been dismissed without prejudice can be re-filed within six months of the dismissal. O.C.G.A. sec. 9-2-61. Thus, this type of dismissal does not necessarily result in a final resolution of the underlying dispute. A previous study found that voluntary dismissals without prejudice account for approximately 20% of all dispositions of Georgia tort cases. (Eaton et al, 2000) . not advance either of these goals. For example, Polinsky and Shavell (1998) argued that punitive damages awarded against a corporation (instead of the individuals within the corporation) often unfairly punish innocent shareholders and customers, and thus fail to promote the punishment goal of such awards. Others maintain that the deterrence goal is undermined by the unpredictable nature of such awards. Karpoff and Lott (2000) found that only 1-2% of the variation in punitive damage awards can be explained and concluded that such awards are highly variable and unpredictable. Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade (1998) reached similar conclusions based on a controlled study of mock jurors. Sustein, Kahneman, Schkade, and Ritov (2002) evoked principles of cognitive psychology to explain why jurors are unable to translate qualitative moral judgments into quantitative numeric scales.
The jury is the focus of much criticism leveled against punitive damages. The general thrust of this body of scholarship is that jurors are "ill-informed and poorly equipped" to assess risk (Haistie and Viscusi, 1998) . Jurors, it is said, are "given unlimited discretion but only limited guidance in deciding an amount of punitive damages" (Schkade, 2002) . More specifically, jurors may be subject to a "hindsight bias," meaning that they are more likely to view conduct as reckless and egregious after the fact of an injury (Hastie, Schkade, and Payne, 1999) . Jurors are also thought to be disinclined to base the size of a punitive damage award on achieving optimal deterrence and cannot accurately calculate a punitive damage award using formulas (in the form of jury instructions) designed to achieve such deterrence (Viscusi, 2001 and . Some studies suggest that juries tend to overestimate the risk of low probability-large loss events (Hastie and Viscusi, 1998; Viscusi, 2001) , will punish corporations for engaging in risk-cost analysis (Viscusi, 2001 (Viscusi, , 2002 , and are influenced by other legally inappropriate factors, such as the identities of the parties (Hastie et al., 1999) . These criticisms have led to suggestions that judges rather than juries should decide whether punitive damages should be awarded, and if so, in what amount (Hastie and Viscusi, 1998; Mogin, 1998; Schkade et al., 2000; Sunstein et al., 1998; Sunstein, Kahneman, Schkade, and Ritov, 2002) .
In contrast, another body of scholarship maintains that these criticisms are exaggerated. A number of empirical studies have found that punitive damages are rarely awarded (Eaton, et al. 2000; Eisenberg et al., 1997; Luban, 1998; Merrit and Berry, 1999; Rustad, 1992; Vidmar and Rose, 2001 ); are especially rare in the areas that have captured the most attention, products liability and medical malpractice (Eaton, et al., 2000; Eisenberg et al., 1997; Merritt and Berry, 1999) ; tend to be awarded in cases involving intentional misconduct (Rustad, 1997) ; and correlate strongly with compensatory damages in magnitude (Eisenberg et al., 1997; Eisenberg and Wells, 1999; Moller et al., 1999; Vidmar and Rose, 2001) . Moreover, the largest punitive damage awards are often reduced by post-verdict or appellate review (Koenig, 1998; Moller, 1996; Moller et al., 1999 , Peterson, 1987 Rustad, 1998) . Eisenberg, LaFountain, Ostrom, Rottman, and Wells, (2002) explained how real world features of the legal system reduce the theoretical incoherence or effects of incoherence on punitive damages awards. One recent survey of the literature concludes that "lay decision-making is much more orderly in many respects than is suggested by the reform rhetoric" (Robbennolt, 2002) .
The robust body of scholarship summarized in the preceding paragraphs concerns the actual awards of punitive damages at trial, but does not address the shadow effect that such awards have on the processing of other claims. Here the literature is quite sparse. Polinsky (1997) hypothesized that the threat of punitive damages may carry greater consequences than actual verdicts, especially to the extent that the threat may give unfair bargaining power against corporate defendants and inflate both the rate and amount of settlements. He argued, "the cases in which punitive damages are likely to be of greatest potential importance at trial are also cases that may be disproportionately likely to settle ... thus there could be very few judgments at trial in which punitive damages are awarded, yet settlement amounts might reflect a substantial component of punitive damages."
Priest asserts " [i] t is obvious and indisputable that a punitive damages claim increases the magnitude of the ultimate settlement and, indeed, affects the entire settlement process, increasing the likelihood of litigation" (Priest, 1996) . Moller et al. (1999) suggested that a claim for punitive damages might attract adverse publicity, thereby creating an incentive for some defendants to settle cases.
Despite the potential importance of this shadow effect, there has been virtually no empirical research on the topic. Priest offers data on the percentage of tort cases in which punitive damages were sought in three Alabama counties in a two-year period (Priest, 1996) . He presents no data, however, to substantiate his claim that asserting a punitive damages claim will affect the settlement process and increase the magnitude of settlement payments. Koenig (1998) offered a preliminary analysis with data that were collected for other studies and reported that insurance adjusters give little weight to a claim for punitive damages during settlement negotiations. Kritzer and Zemans (1998) reviewed the existing literature and concluded "with perhaps one exception, what little systemic evidence we could find does not support the notion that the threat of punitive damages 8 casts a large shadow." More recently, Vidmar and Rose (2001) in their study of punitive damages in Florida concluded that "despite frequent claims by tort reform proponents in Florida, and around the county, that punitive damages claims produces an in terrorem effect on corporate defendants, there is not systematically documented evidence that this is so." Vidmar and Rose characterized such a shadow effect in products liability cases as "extremely improbable" given the exceedingly low number of such cases (other than those involving asbestos) in which punitive damages were awarded.
The one proposition on which all researchers seem to agree is that more data are needed to determine what impact, if any, a claim for punitive damages has on the processing of tort cases. We now turn to this question.
METHODOLOGY

A. Data
To examine the effect of the decision to seek punitive damages on key decision points in tort litigation, we use a unique data set of more than 25,000 tort cases filed in There are several distinct features of this data set. First, our six county sites were not randomly selected. Because there is no state agency or office that maintains any statewide record of civil court cases, we were not able to draw a random sample of cases from all the state's Superior and State Courts. Therefore, we decided to collect tort litigation data in metropolitan Atlanta (Cobb, Fulton and Gwinnett counties) where the state's population is concentrated. We added Bibb County to represent an urban area outside of Atlanta, Irwin County as a decidedly rural jurisdiction, and Oconee County as an historically rural county in the midst of substantial population growth.
Second, we studied every tort case in the aforementioned jurisdictions and identified them by filing date and not date of disposition. It was not possible to identify all tort cases between 1994 and 1997 and draw a random sample because in most counties research staff had to examine all civil litigation records simply to identify tort cases. Therefore, including the universe of tort cases identified in this process made the most sense. Similarly, it was not possible to identify a sampling frame on date of disposition or even examine civil case records in this fashion for the years in question, so we were left with date of filing as the basis of case selection.
Third, our data set includes cases from both Superior and State Courts. In That our data set consists of several different counties in one state, covers a fouryear time period, consists of the universe of related cases, is based on date of filing and not disposition, and that it includes both State and Superior Court records makes our study unique. The degree to which our descriptive findings are consistent with other large-scale studies of civil litigation (Eaton et al. 2000) , however, helps to put these unique attributes in perspective. Of particular interest is the study conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the National Center for State Courts (Litras et al. 2000) .
This research examines 15,000 tort trials selected from the nation's 75 largest counties and disposed of in 1996. The general pattern of findings reported is remarkably similar to those we highlighted earlier (Eaton et al. 2000) .
In addition to information on the decision to seek punitive damages, each tort case lists the number of attorneys, the number of litigants and defendants, the types of litigants and defendants, type of claim, and whether there was an allegation of a wrongful death.
There is also information about how each case was disposed, pre-trial hearings, and the amounts and types of damages. Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the data. The first section, which lists the type of disposition, contains the dependent variables in the analysis. The other categories are type of case, case information, plaintiff and defendant information, the county and the year the case was filed.
In this research, we examine whether the decision to seek punitive damages affects many aspects of the processing of tort claims. In doing so, we offer an initial test of the proposition offered by Polinsky (1997) that punitive damages affect not only case outcome but also case processing. Also, we examine how the effects of seeking punitive damages compare with other important factors that affect both case disposition and case processing. punitive damages affects the settlement amount. Parties to a settlement are not required to disclose amounts, and sometimes the settlement explicitly prohibits parties from disclosing the amount.
B. Estimation
Equation (1) outlines our basic empirical strategy:
There are six dependent variables, it y , for case i in year t : (1) whether a case filed was disposed or pending; 9 (2) whether a case that was disposed was done so by trial or by some other procedure, including settlement; 10 (3) whether a case was more likely to be disposed by settlement (e.g., voluntary dismissal with prejudice); (4) whether a case was more likely to be disposed by a voluntary dismissal without prejudice so that it could be re-filed; (5) whether a case disposed by trial involved a jury and bench trial; and (6) whether punitive damages were awarded in trials with outcomes in favor of the plaintiff.
Each of these outcomes is binary, and we will estimate the likelihood of their occurrences with a logit regression.
9 It would also be very interesting to examine whether seeking punitive damages affects the length of time for a case to be disposed. Unfortunately, the data include only whether a case was disposed and not length of time between initial filing and final disposition.
For each of these six outcomes we present two regression specifications-one for cases likely to have capped punitive damages and one for cases unlikely to have caps. 16 In the regression Fulton County, which contains 53.9% of all cases is the omitted county. 17 The largest share of cases (28.9%) was from 1997, which is omitted in the regressions.
RESULTS
A. Likelihood of the Case Being Disposed
Our first step is to understand what types of cases are quickly resolved and which remain pending. To accomplish this we run a logit regression of whether the case was disposed by the time we obtained the data. Figure 1 shows that 19.1% of the cases were still pending, and 80.9% were disposed. We expect the least complicated cases to be disposed more quickly. Although we have no direct measure of case complexity, we proxy it with a variable for the number of participants in the case. Products liability and malpractice cases also tend to be legally and factually more complex. We also expect that cases are less likely to be disposed in Superior than State courts. This anticipated difference is a function of the mandatory jurisdiction of Superior courts in Georgia. All divorce cases and criminal felonies must be filed in Superior Court, with the latter taking precedence over civil cases. Many plaintiffs' attorneys believe they can get a trial date more quickly in State than Superior Court. Last, controlling for other factors, we expect that cases filed earlier will be more likely to be resolved. Therefore, we anticipate that cases filed in 1994 will be most likely to be disposed and cases filed in 1997, the last year of the data, to be least likely to be disposed. Table 3 displays the results of the logit regression that predicts the likelihood of a case being disposed. Column 1 includes cases that are likely to be capped while Column 2 includes the cases that are likely to be uncapped. Contrary to the claim that seeking punitive damages would delay the processing of the case, both specifications show that the decision to seek punitive damages has no statistical effect on the likelihood of case disposal.
As expected, cases in Superior Courts are much less likely to be disposed. The marginal effects 18 implied by the point estimates in Table 3 imply that controlling for all the other factors, cases that are likely to be capped and are in Superior Court are 1.9% less likely to be disposed while cases that are unlikely to be capped and are in Superior Court are 3.0% less likely to be disposed.
Other statistically significant results for cases likely to be capped (Column 1)
show decreases in the probability of a disposition-a FELA case (4.3%) and having insurance (1.1%) or medical companies (6.0%) as defendants. An additional defendant decreases the likelihood of disposition by 0.7%. In contrast, cases are more likely to be disposed when the claim is categorized as "Other" (3.6%), the plaintiff is an insurance company (5.2%), and the defendant is a business (1.1%). An additional plaintiff increases the probability of disposition by 0.8%.
In cases likely to be uncapped (Column 2), the likelihood of disposition is decreased by 1.0% for an additional plaintiff and 2.0% for an additional defendant. Libelslander cases are 5.6% more likely and defective product cases are 8.2% more likely to be disposed than intentional torts. Cases are more likely to be disposed when the plaintiff is an insurance firm (10.3%), or the defendant is a financial institution (11.1%) or the government (6.8%). A financial institution as a plaintiff reduces the likelihood of disposing cases likely to be uncapped by 37.2%. 18 The tables report point estimates from the logit regressions. Although these estimates provide the correct qualitative sign, they do not directly imply a quantitative magnitude. Therefore, in the text we also report the marginal effects of the statistically significant results.
In both columns, the results for the years are exactly as predicted. Cases filed in 1994 are most likely to be disposed, followed by those filed in 1995 and 1996, while cases filed in 1997 are least likely to be resolved.
B. Likelihood of a Case Being Disposed with a Trial
Studies have consistently shown that the vast majority of cases are not resolved in the trial court, and our data confirm this. Of disposed cases in our sample, 95.2% of them are resolved without a trial. Table 4 evaluates the likelihood of a case being disposed with a trial. The coefficient estimate on whether to seek punitive damages in Column 1 is close to zero and not statistically significant. An additional plaintiff reduces the likelihood of a trial by -0.6%. In Column 2, the coefficient estimate on requesting punitive damages is not statistically significant at the .10 level. However, it would be significant at the .15 level, thus providing some weak evidence that cases likely to be uncapped that request punitive damages may be slightly more likely to be resolved by a trial.
C. Likelihood of a Case Being Settled
The most likely resolution of a case is settlement, which accounts for 52.2% of the disposed cases in our sample. Theory suggests that greater uncertainty about the outcome decreases the likelihood of a settlement (Mnookin, Peppet, and Tulumello 2000) . Because all parties involved must pay large fixed costs to go to trial, cases where the plaintiffs and defendants have significantly different expectations about the outcome are more likely to go to trial. If both parties agree on the range of probable outcomes before the trial, then the litigants can make themselves better off by settling and avoiding the trial costs. Because the outcome of these simple cases is relatively clear, they are more likely to be settled while more complex cases are less likely to be settled. Table 5 examines the likelihood of a case being settled. The estimate of the effect of seeking punitive damages reported in Column 1 is negative and not distinguishable from 0, thereby suggesting that the threat of punitive damages is not being used to force settlements in cases likely to be capped. Also, the likelihood of settling is reduced by an additional plaintiff (4.9%) and an additional percentage increase in the fraction of pro se plaintiffs (0.2%). An additional defendant increases the likelihood of settling by 1.2%.
Column 2 of Table 5 is notable because it is the only time in the paper (with the exception of whether punitive damages are actually awarded) that the estimate for a request for punitive damages has a statistically significant result. In contrast to the Polinksy (1997) contention that cases that seek punitive damages disproportionately settle, this evidence indicates that in cases likely to be uncapped, the decision to seek punitive damages actually reduces the likelihood to settle. Also, cases that are likely to be uncapped are less likely to be settled if they have a wrongful death claim and if they are heard in Superior Court rather than State Court.
D. Likelihood of the Case Being Voluntarily Dismissed without Prejudice
Over one-fifth of the cases that are dismissed without a trial are voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. Under Georgia Code §9-2-61 (1999), the state gives the plaintiff the right to voluntarily dismiss his or her case and re-file it within six months, subject to any relevant statutes of limitations. In practice, this law allows plaintiffs to start a case and obtain a temporary delay if problems should arise. One might predict that this option would be exercised more frequently in complex cases that are more likely to have unexpected twists. Consequently, we anticipate the estimated coefficient on most types of cases will be positive and significant as compared to automobile accident claims. Table 6 shows the likelihood that a case will be voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. Like most of the other results, the decision to seek punitive damages does not affect this outcome in either specification. The fraction of pro se plaintiffs reduces the likelihood of the outcome for both types of cases. Column 1 indicates that wrongful death cases are 3.4% less likely to be voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. Also, an additional plaintiff increases the probability of this option being exercised by 4.2%. This is not surprising as litigants in cases with multiple plaintiffs may discover that the plaintiffs have separate and perhaps divergent interests.
E. Likelihood of a Jury Trial
As noted previously, much of the criticism of tort litigation has been directed to the role and function of the jury. Critics of punitive damages maintain that juries are more likely to award punitive damages with greater frequency and for larger sums than judges.
Since juries are thought to favor the plaintiff and since the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial absent an explicit waiver, one might expect that a punitive damage claim would increase the likelihood of a jury trial. Table 7 examines the determinants of jury trials vs. bench trials. Jury and bench trials are rare phenomena, as they comprise 3.1% and 0.8% of all cases filed, respectively. In Column 1, the result for cases that seek punitive damages is not statistically significant, and its coefficient estimate is negative, the opposite of what would be expected if plaintiffs preferred to present their case before juries. For cases likely to be uncapped (Column 2) the coefficient estimate on the request for punitive damages is positive, which is more consistent with the contention that plaintiffs seeking punitive damages would prefer to have a jury trial. However, its coefficient estimate is much less than its standard error, and therefore, is nowhere close to being statistically significant.
Pro se plaintiffs (in Column 1) and defendants (in both specifications) are less likely to have jury trials. In Column 2, Superior Court cases are 40.6% more likely to have a jury trial, and an additional defendant decreases by 11.4% the likelihood of having a jury trial.
F. Likelihood of Being Awarded Punitive Damages
There have been many criticisms of punitive damages. Some of the most frequently articulated concerns focus on the lack of jury competency in assigning such awards and assume that juries are much more likely than judges to award punitive damages. Critics contend that juries exhibit hindsight bias, are unable to evaluate risk rationally, and are biased against corporations, particularly very large and prosperous ones.
Contrary to popular belief, punitive damages are awarded very rarely. This Georgia sample contains only 15 punitive damage awards, or less than 0.1% of the entire sample. Table 7 evaluates the likelihood of being awarded punitive damages conditioned on winning a trial. Because there are so few observations and so few punitive damage awards, the standard errors are quite high and very few variables in the entire regression are statistically significant. The first column shows that cases that seek punitive damages are more likely to receive a punitive award; a result that would be astonishing if it were not true. There is no reported estimate for the request for punitive damages in Column 2, because there are only 25 observations and every case that made a request for punitives was given an award.
Both specifications indicate that there is a statistically significant greater chance of a punitive damage award in Superior than State court. The coefficient estimate in Column 2 implies that a bench trial increases the likelihood of being awarded punitive damages by 8.4%, consistent with Eisenberg, LaFountain, Ostrom, Rottman, and Wells (2002) . After controlling for other factors, juries in Georgia are not more likely than judges to award punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
Many critics of tort law and litigation have alleged that allowing plaintiffs to seek punitive damages significantly increases the costs imposed throughout the judicial system as many file claims in hopes of forcing large settlements or winning exorbitant punitive damages. Most studies confine their attention to a very narrow range of issues when investigating punitive damages; specifically they evaluate what occurs at trial. Although this question is important, trials account for only a small fraction of cases filed, and therefore, such studies essentially ignore effects that could occur throughout the rest of the system. This unique data set that includes all cases filed allows us to provide one of the first analyses of the impact of punitive damages throughout the entire tort litigation process.
The results show that contrary to the expectation of many critics (e.g., Polinsky, 1997; Priest, 1996 ) the decision to seek punitive damages has no statistically significant impact on most phases of the litigation process. Specifically, we found that the decision to seek punitive damages had no effect on (1) whether a case filed in any given year was disposed or pending; (2) whether a case that was disposed was done so by trial or by some other procedure, including settlement; (3) whether a case that was disposed by means other than a trial was more likely to have been settled; and (4) whether a case that was disposed by means other than a trial was more likely to have been disposed by a voluntary dismissal without prejudice so that it could be re-filed. These findings are consistent with those reported by Koenig (1998) that the inclusion of a claim for punitive damages does not have much effect on the processing of tort claims. They also lend additional support to the observations of Kritzer and Zemans (1998) and Vidmar and Rose (2001) that there is little systemic evidence that the threat of punitive damages casts a large shadow.
Seeking punitive damages only affected two of the outcome variables. Cases in which punitive damages are sought were more likely to have punitive damages awarded, an obvious and expected result. However, the second result was unexpected. In cases that are resolved by trial, those seeking punitive damages claims are more likely to be tried by a judge. This finding may be of some interest to those who study differences between bench and jury trials. Conventional wisdom posits that juries have a pro-plaintiff bias and are more likely to find liability when a judge would not. This conventional wisdom has been challenged by a number of studies. Although related empirical evidence is limited, several studies have found that plaintiffs actually enjoy a higher success rate in bench as compared to jury trials, at least in certain types of torts (Clermont and Eisenberg, 1992; Eaton and Talarico, 1996; Eaton et al., 2000; DeFrances and Litras, 1999) . With regard to punitive damages in particular, Eaton et al., (2000) found that punitive damages were awarded in a higher percentage of Georgia bench trials than jury trials. Eisenberg, LaFountain, Ostrom, Rottman, and Wells (2002) reported similar findings using a national data set, but noted that the differences were not statistically significant. This study concluded that "[j]uries and judges award punitive damages at about the same rate, and their punitive awards bear about the same relation to their compensatory awards." Hersch and Vicusi (2002) , employing a different methodology on the same data used by Eisenberg, LaFountain, Ostrom, Rottman, and Wells (2002) , concluded that juries are more likely to make punitive damage awards and make larger awards than judges.
Regardless of how similar or different judges perform as compared to juries in awarding punitive damages, it is interesting that the parties are more likely to select a bench trial in cases involving uncapped punitive damages claims. As a general matter, bench trials occur only when both parties agree to waive their right to a trial by jury.
Further research is needed to better understand what set of circumstances might lead both parties to agree to a bench trial in cases involving uncapped punitive damages.
We did find some differences in the effects of capped and uncapped punitive damages on case processing. Tort suits with uncapped punitive damage claims were more likely to be disposed by trial as compared to suits with capped punitive damage claims.
Furthermore, tort suits with uncapped punitive damage claims were less likely to be disposed by settlement than suits with capped punitive damage claims. These findings are inconsistent with Polinsky's (1997) hypothesis that the threat of punitive damages will coerce more settlements. In fact, our data tend to suggest just the opposite-a claim for uncapped punitive damages impedes rather than coerces settlement. Perhaps this is because an uncapped punitive damage claim creates greater uncertainty as to the value of the suit. The greater the disparity between the parties' valuation of the case, the less likely a suit is to settle (Mnookin, et al. 2000) . 
